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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT 
The Federal Arbitration Act, in contrast to common law, makes 
arbitration agreements in contracts "evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce" valid and enforceable. Recent decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court mandate that the federal Act 
be applied in both federal and state courts. In this comment, the 
author traces the history of the federal Act and addresses the 
threshold question of what activities satisfy the commerce re-
quirement. The author examines the inconsistencies that arise 
when the federal Act is applied in state courts and urges Con-
gress to revise the Act in light of these inconsistencies. Finally, 
potential changes in Maryland commercial arbitration law are 
explored. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although most commentaries on the modern day litigation explo-
sion focus on the number of cases resolved in the courts, I a large number 
of disputes now are resolved in the hearing rooms of arbitrators. 2 Conse-
quently, several recent United States Supreme Court decisions have con-
strued the law of commercial arbitration.3 In Southland Corp. v. 
I. See Van Dusen, Comments on the Volume of Litigation in the Federal Courts, 8 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 435 (1983) (discussing the effect of the litigation explosion on the 
judicial system); Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing Its 
Caseload to Achieve Its Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1983) (dis-
cussing the effect of the litigation explosion on the Supreme Court). 
During the twelve month period ending June 30, 1984, there were 261,485 civil 
cases filed in United States district courts. THE LA WYERS ALMANAC 698 (1985) 
(Law & Business, Inc.!Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers). It is estimated that 
only two percent of all civil litigation in the United States is in the federal courts. 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.8 (1984). 
2. There were almost 40,000 commercial, labor, accident, and construction cases filed 
with the American Arbitration Association in 1984. The Arbitration Alternative, 71 
A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (Feb. 1985). The number of commercial and labor cases arbitrated 
has more than doubled in the past decade. !d. Arbitration has been defined as: 
[A] contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any controversy or dis-
pute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the 
matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit 
their controversy to such judges for determination, in place of the tribu-
nals provided by the ordinary processes of law. 
M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (1984) (citing Gates v. Arizona 
Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1930)). 
For a discussion of court-annexed, as opposed to private arbitration, see Snow 
& Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court-Annexed Arbitation, 20 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 43 (1983). 
3. During the eleven month period between February, 1983 and January, 1984, two 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States construed the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (Act or federal Act). These were Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Prior to these decisions the Court had not 
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Keating,4 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corp. ,5 the Court explicitly reinforced a judicial policy promoting the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It is clear that both the high cost 
of litigation and the burden on the courts resulting from the high volume 
of litigation have played a crucial role in these decisions.6 
Although state law governs most contract issues,7 the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions have summarily mandated that the Federal Ar-
bitration ActS (Act or federal Act) is to be applied in state as well as 
federal court proceedings for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 9 
This comment will explore the development of the Act since its inception 
as a procedural device in 1925, through its post-Erie classification as 
"substantive," and will address a number of inconsistencies that have 
arisen when the Act is applied in state courts. This comment encourages 
Congress to revise the Act in light of these inconsistencies and addresses 
the threshold question to be met when considering the Act's applicability 
in state courts - whether interstate commerce is involved. Finally, po-
tential changes in Maryland commercial arbitration law will be 
examined. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Response to the Unenforceability of Arbitration Agreements - The 
Federal Arbitration Act 
At common law, a majority of courts found agreements to arbitrate 
contrary to public policy, void, and unenforceable. \0 This doctrine was 
based largely upon two characteristics - jealousy and the quest for pres-
tige. 11 These characteristics pervaded the courts and resulted in judicial 
decisions calculated to dispel the threat that arbitration imposed upon 
the scope of the courts' jurisdiction. 12 
been faced with an issue of interpretation of the federal Act since Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
4. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
5. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
6. See The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A.I. 78 (1985). 
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
8. 9 U.S.c. §§ 1-14 (1982). 
9. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 14-15 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983) (dicta). 
10. See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS §§ 22-23 (1930). 
For a review of the reasons advanced at common law for refusing to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements, see United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petro-
leum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
Although at common law an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was voida-
ble, a party who was aggrievied by a breach of this agreement could maintain an 
action for damages suffered as a result of the breach. These damages, however, were 
usually nominal. Typically, a court refused to exercise its equity power to enforce an 
agreement, recognizing the parties freedom to arbitrate if both were agreeable. See 
W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS §§ 22-23 (1930). 
11. See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 15 & n.4 (1930). 
12. Dicta in a decision by Lord Coke, Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609), is 
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Although prior to the enactment of the federal Act some state 
courts displayed a willingness to enforce arbitration agreements,I3 the 
federal courts remained steadfastly opposed. 14 This dichotomy presented 
a conflict for the federal courts, which on the one hand sought to follow 
federal decisional law,ls and on the other were faced with the Rules of 
Decision Act which required that the "laws of the several states ... be 
regarded as rules of decision .... "16 A number of federal courts held 
arbitration agreements unenforceable as a matter of general federallaw,I7 
perhaps relying on the language of the Supreme Court's Swift v. Tyson 18 
decision, which interpreted the Rules of Decision Act not to require ap-
plication of state law on issues of "general law."19 
In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted.20 Section 2 of the 
credited with initiating the idea that arbitration is disfavored because it "ousts" the 
court of its jurisdiction. See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
AWARDS § 15 n.3 (1930); Comment, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Under the 
United States Arbitration Act, 27 TEX. L. REV. 218, 218 n.4 (1948). 
13. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlsberger, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 
(1921) (executory agreement to arbitrate valid and enforceable under New York 
law); ZindorfConstr. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 P.374 (1901) (exec-
utory agreement to arbitrate precludes action at law); Monongahela Navigation Co. 
v. Fenlon, 4 Watts & Sergo 205 (Pa. 1842) (engineer's expertise warrants validity of 
arbitration agreement in construction contract). 
14. See Haskell V. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 405 (9th Cir. 1923); Jefferson Fire 
Ins. CO. V. Bierce & Sage, Inc., 183 F. 588 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1910); Mitchell V. 
Dougherty, 90 F. 639 (3d Cir. 1898); Tobey V. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065); Lappe V. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926); 
U.S. Asphalt Ref. CO. V. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 
1915). 
15. See supra note 14. The reason for the federal courts' desire to follow federal deci-
sionallaw is unclear. One commentator has stated that the purpose was to establish 
nationwide uniformity of decision. See Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration 
Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie V. Tompkins, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 74, 80 
(1953). Because none of the federal cases actually discuss the choice of law issue at 
length, it is likely that the federal courts simply saw invalidation of arbitration 
agreements as the better rule. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS 
LAW § 110 (rev. ed. 1968) (discussing the "better rule" as a basis for choice of law); 
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.27 (2d ed. 1980) 
(same). 
16. 28 U.S.c. § 1652 (1982) (corresponds to judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,1 Stat. 
73, 92); see infra note 19 (discussing commentary on courts' failure to apply the 
Rules of Decision Act). 
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
19. /d. at 18. None of the cases specifically discuss the issue of the applicability of the 
Rules of Decision Act as interpreted by Swift V. Tyson. See supra note 14. Several 
commentators, however, have discussed the issue. See Kochery, supra note 15, at 
78; Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 V AN. L. REV. 607, 612 
(1967). For an early commentary questioning the propriety of the federal courts in 
ignoring the Rules of Decision Act, see Federal Courts - Authority of State Law-
Refusal to Apply New York Arbitration Law, 40 HARV. L. REV. 649 (1926-27). 
20. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213,43 Stat. 883. Section 14 of the original version named 
the Act the United States Arbitration act. 9 U.S.c. § 14 (1946). In 1947, however, 
section 14 was repealed. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 2, 61 Stat. 669. The Act 
has since been referred to as both the United States Arbitration Act and the Federal 
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Act holds valid and irrevocable those agreements to arbitrate based on a 
"written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce."21 Section 3 provided for a stay of judicial proceedings pend-
ing arbitration,22 and section 4 provided for specific performance of an 
agreement to arbitrate.23 
The Act did little to settle the choice of law issues confronting the 
federal courts. The focus of attention turned to whether the requirement 
of interstate commerce set forth in section 2 was similarly required to 
invoke the other provisions of the Act.24 Neither section 3 nor section 4 
mentioned the commerce requirement. The one Supreme Court decision 
construing the Act during this period, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus,25 
found its jurisdictional basis in admiralty, thereby shedding no light on 
the subject.26 This decision was important, however, because it charac-
terized arbitration as a procedural device under the federal Act.27 
Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, a majority of the lower 
federal courts interpreted the language of section 2 to require interstate 
commerce, in addition to the usual jurisdictional prerequisites of amount 
in controversy and diversity, before any provisions of the new Act would 
Arbitration Act. The early legislative history of the Act is traced in Sturges & Mur-
phy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbi-
tration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580, 580 n.l (1952). 
21. 9 U.S.c. § 2 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 
§ 2, 43 Stat. 883). Section 2 provides: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, of an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). 
22. 9 U.S.c. § 3 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 
§ 3, 43 Stat. 883). Section 3 provides: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writ-
ing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is refera-
ble to arbitration under such agreement, shall on application of one of the 
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for 
the stay is not in default in proceedings with such arbitration. 
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). 
23. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 
§ 4, 43 Stat. 883). Section 4 provides in pertinent part: "[A] party aggrieved by the 
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement 
for arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order di-
recting that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agree-
ment." 9 U.S.c. § 4 (1982). 
24. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
25. 284 U.S. 263 (1932). 
26. See id. at 272. 
27. See id. at 277-78. 
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apply.28 Hence, lack of interstate commerce in federal diversity actions 
often precluded application of the federal Act.29 Furthermore, state arbi-
tration law was similarly inapplicable on the theory that arbitration was 
a procedural device,30 and under accepted conflicts rules, procedural is-
sues were to be governed by the law of the forum. 31 
B. The Erie Doctrine - Is Arbitration Substance or Procedure? 
The Supreme Court's landmark decision, Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins,32 did little to clear up the confusion regarding the jurisdic-
tional scope of the new federal Act. Instead, it created another question 
- whether the Act would still be considered procedural - and under-
mined the rationale of those prior federal court decisions that had deter-
mined arbitration to be "general federal law" in diversity cases. 33 The 
Erie doctrine mandates the application of state substantive law in federal 
diversity suits. In light of this, the Supreme Court's characterization of 
arbitration as procedural for all purposes in Marine Transit 34 became the 
subject of criticism. Commentators argued that some provisions of the 
Act were procedural, but that other provisions were undoubtedly sub-
stantive and should be treated as such for choice of law purposes.3S 
The development of the "outcome determinative" test by the 
Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 36 redefined the scope of 
the purely objective substance/procedure test contemplated by Erie. In 
Guaranty Trust, the Court declared that "the intent of [Erie] was to in-
28. See, e.g., Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933); 
In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1929); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 
184 (D. Del. 1930); see also Note, Arbitration Law of the Last Decade, 26 VA. L. 
REV. 327, 340-41 (1940) (discussing jurisdictional prerequisites for application of 
the federal Act). 
29. See In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Pa. 1935); The Volsinio, 32 
F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929). 
30. See California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz Am. Co., 60 F.2d 788, 790 
(9th Cir. 1932) (plaintiff's action in federal court to invoke state arbitration statute 
denied); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (state arbitration act is 
procedural, not substantive and therefore is not binding on the federal courts). 
31. See Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1857); Union Bank v. Jolly's 
Adm'rs, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503, 507 (1855); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
67, 75 (1840); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I (1825); 2 J. BEALE, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1247-48 (1935). 
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. According to Erie, "[t]here is no general 
federal common law." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
34. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277-78 (1932). The Supreme Court 
had characterized arbitration as procedural as early as 1864 in Heckers v. Fowler, 
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864), where a judgment entered by a clerk of the court upon 
the report of an arbitrator was held valid and enforceable. Prior to the enactment of 
the federal Act, the Court reaffirmed this characterization in Red Cross Line v. 
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
35. See Kochery, supra note 15, at 77-78; Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Con-
flict of Laws, 38 YALE L.J. 617, 617-18 (1929). 
36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
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sure that in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely 
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the 
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same. . . as it 
would be if tried in a State court."37 Thus, the stage was set for a virtual 
emasculation of the federal Act. 
In view of the language in Guaranty Trust, one would expect that in 
a diversity action where state law would not enforce an arbitration agree-
ment, a federal court would be forced to ignore the federal Act. Thus, 
the federal Act would be precluded in any diversity action where state 
law considered arbitration unenforceable. 38 The few cases addressing 
this issue in the wake of Guaranty Trust, however, reached the opposite 
concl usion. 39 
For a clear understanding of these cases, attention must first be di-
rected to the distinction between viewing the Act as "substantive" under 
Erie and viewing the Act as "federal substantive law." The former re-
quires deference to state law in federal courts; the latter relies upon an 
exercise of Congressional power as justification for the application of fed-
eral law in federal courts, regardless of conflicting state laws.40 
In Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills,41 the federal district court con-
spicuously avoided Guaranty Trust and held that, "legislating within its 
constitutional domain, Congress has declared, as a matter of substantive 
law, that an arbitration agreement ... is valid and enforceable."42 Simi-
larly, in Local 19 Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. ,43 applying 
the federal Act to a labor contract, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit recognized that the Act creates federal rights in arbitration and 
37. /d. at 109. 
38. See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A 
Farrago of Rights. Remedies. and A Right to A Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 847-48 
(1959-60) [hereinafter cited as Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2]; Robert Lawrence Co. 
v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1959). 
39. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. But see Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough 
Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947). 
40. Compare Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947) (arbitra-
tion is substantive for Erie purposes, therefore state law prevails) with Local 19 
Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) (federal 
Act creates federal rights in arbitration) and Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. 
Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946) (arbitration is a matter of federal substantive law). 
In Tejas, the court intimated that section 2 of the federal Act was inapplicable 
because the contract was not one of interstate commerce. However, in response to 
an argument that the enforcement sections of the Act, sections 3 and 4, applied 
despite the absence of commerce, the court stated that the question was "not as to 
the method of enforcement of a valid award, but of the validity of the awards and 
the binding effect of the agreement to arbitrate, both of which are matters of state 
substantive law." Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 278-79 (5th Cir. 
1947) (emphasis added). Citing Erie, the court held that because arbitration was 
state substantive law, the outcome of the suit "can become no better by going into 
Federal court. . . than ... in State Courts." [d. 
41. 65 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946), a./f'd, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953). 
42. /d. at 603. 
43. 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956). 
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held that state law does not control.44 These cases posed the question 
whether, in light of Erie's prohibition of general federal common law, the 
federal courts constitutionally could apply the federal Act as a matter of 
federal substantive law.45 Although not addressed therein, this constitu-
tional question was also recognized by the Supreme Court in Bernhardt 
v. Polygraphic Co. of America.46 
C. Arbitration as Substantive Federal Law 
In Bernhardt, the Supreme Court considered whether section 3 of 
the federal Act, providing for a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbi-
tration, could be applied in a federal diversity suit absent a transaction 
involving commerce.47 The plaintiff brought a breach of contract action 
in a Vermont state court. Realizing that the contract's arbitration agree-
ment would not be enforced under Vermont law, the defendant sought 
removal to federal district court and, once therein, a stay of court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration in accordance with section 3 of the federal 
Act.48 
The district court refused to grant the stay, relying on the Guaranty 
Trust "outcome determinative" test and the treatment of arbitration 
agreements under Vermont law as unenforceable.49 The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that commerce was required to invoke only section 2 of 
the Act, and that Erie warranted application of section 3 in federal courts 
solely as a matter of procedure. 50 The Supreme Court, however, dis-
agreed. The Court held that because "[s]ections 1, 2, and 3 are integral 
parts of a whole,"51 the jurisdictional provisions of section 2 are similarly 
applicable to section 3. Because the contract in Bernhardt was not one 
involving commerce, section 3 was inapplicable, and Vermont law 
44. /d. at 781. 
45. See Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2, supra note 38, at 848-49. 
46. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
47.Id. 
48. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 122 F. Supp. 733, 733-34 (D. Vt. 1954), rev'd, 
218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
49. Id. at 734-35. 
50. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948,951 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 
U.S. 198 (1956). Although, prior to Erie, a majority of lower federal courts required 
interstate commerce before application of any of the Act's provisions, see supra note 
28 and accompanying text, several later decisions found section 3 applicable 
notwithstanding an absence of commerce. See, e.g., Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. 
United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries 
Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v. Freemont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. 
Supp. 364 (D.C. Neb. 1948). Most courts, however, continued to require the pres-
ence of commerce before application of section 4. See, e.g., W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. 
Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst., 113 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Ark. 1953); 
Freemont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb. 1949), affd, 
183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1950); San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825 
(S.D.N. Y. 1946). 
51. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956). 
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prevailed. 52 
In response to the argument that section 3 was applicable in all fed-
eral cases as a matter of federal procedural law, the Court held that the 
Act was substantive, not procedural, for Erie purposes. 53 This, however, 
gave rise to a serious constitutional question: Was the Act an unconsti-
tutional infringement upon the right of state courts to formulate the law 
that is followed in federal diversity cases?54 Although Bernhardt raised 
this question, it was left unanswered. 55 
Soon thereafter, this same question was addressed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire 
Fabrics, Inc. 56 In this diversity action, the plaintiff, Robert Lawrence 
Co., sought damages for fraudulent misrepresentations made by the de-
fendant, Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., in inducing the purchase of a quantity 
of wool. Pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the contract, Devon-
shire Fabrics, Inc. moved for a stay of court proceedings pending arbitra-
tion in accordance with section 3 of the federal Act.57 The contract was 
one evidencing a transaction involving commerce. 58 The New York fed-
52. Id. at 200-02. 
53. See id. at 202-03. 
54. Id. at 202. "If respondent's contention is correct, a constitutional question might be 
presented." /d. Justice Frankfurter offered this answer: "[S]ince the United States 
Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to diversity cases ... [the major-
ity's] avoidance of the constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to 
lead to a construction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases." Id. at 208 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
55. Although the Court granted certiorari in Bernhardt "because of the doubtful appli-
cation by the Court of Appeals of Erie," Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200, the issue was 
avoided. The Court stated: "Our view is that § 3, so read, would invade the local 
law field. We therefore read § 3 narrowly to avoid that issue." Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 
at 202. 
Applying the "checklist theory" of the tenth amendment, Professor Ely has 
stated that the Bernhardt Court's reference to the federal Act's invasion of the "lo-
cal law field" was misplaced: "But in suggesting that as a matter of constitutional 
law restrictive of Acts of Congress, a 'local law field' limits the federal government's 
exercise of powers no one doubts it has. . . the Bernhardt court sowed only need-
less confusion." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 706 
(1974). 
Post-Erie federal common law regarding arbitration is also authorized by the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, construed in Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, the Court concluded that Congress, in 
furthering a policy of industrial peace, authorizes "federal courts to fashion a body 
of federal law for . . . specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances 
under collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451. 
See generally, Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964) (discussing the post-Erie growth of federal com-
mon law); Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-
emption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) (same); Bourne, Federal Common Law 
and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 426 (1983) (same). 
56. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 
801 (1960). 
57. See id. at 403-04. 
58. Id. at 409. 
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eral district court denied the stay, relying on New York state law which 
permitted only a court, not an arbitrator, to decide the issue of fraud in 
the inducement of a container contract,59 i. e., a contract that contains an 
arbitration agreement. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. appealed to the Second 
Circuit.60 
The decision whether a court or an arbitrator should decide the va-
lidity of the arbitration agreement was potentially outcome determina-
tive, raising a presumption that under Erie and its progeny state law 
must be followed. 61 Judge Medina, however, writing for the Second Cir-
cuit, relied largely on legislative history and policy considerations to con-
clude that the federal Act created a body of federal substantive law 
affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements.62 To 
hold otherwise, he feared, would emasculate the Act by rendering it inap-
plicable in diversity cases.63 He reasoned that in enacting the Act, Con-
gress intended to exercise its commerce and admiralty powers to remove 
the common law hostility toward arbitration.64 Because the contract in 
Robert Lawrence involved commerce, the federal Act applied in lieu of 
New York state law.65 
The Second Circuit determined that under the federal Act, unlike 
under New York law, an agreement to arbitrate is separable from the 
container contract, and therefore an allegation of fraud must be directed 
to the arbitration agreement itself before the agreement is deemed void.66 
This determination was based not only upon the Act's language, but also 
upon policy considerations and the common law treatment of arbitration 
agreements as separable.67 The court reasoned that the reference in sec-
tion 2 to a specific "written provision" and the reference in section 3 to 
an "agreement in writing" for arbitration suggests a distinction between 
59. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,404,412 (2d Cir. 
1959). The rationale behind refusal to send the fraud issue to arbitration is that a 
container contract and the agreement to arbitrate within are inseparable; therefore 
an allegation of fraud in the making of a container contract is similarly an allegation 
of fraud in the making of the agreement to arbitrate. See Wrap Vertiser Corp. v. 
Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (overruled in 
Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190,298 N.E.2d 42, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973»; Manu-
facturers Chemical Co. v. Caswell Strauss & Co., 259 A.D. 321, 19 N.Y.S.2d 171 
(1940); see also, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 412-
16 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arbitration of fraud issue raises questions of due 
process); George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 885 
(La. 1977), ajJ'd on remand, 376 So. 2d 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (arbitration of 
fraud issue denies rights to jury trial and appeal); Note, Federal Arbitration Act and 
Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588 
( 1968) (discussing rationale of separability). 
60. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 402. 
61. Id. at 404-05. 
62. Id. at 406. 
63. Id. at 404. 
64. Id. at 406-07. 
65. Id. at 409. 
66. Id. at 411. 
67. !d. at 409-10. 
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the container contract and the arbitration agreement.68 Recognizing the 
tenuous nature of relying solely on this reasoning, the court buttressed its 
argument with the historical separability of arbitration agreements.69 In 
addition, the court resorted to the Act's "liberal policy of promoting ar-
bitration"?O in arriving at its conclusion that the arbitration agreement 
was separable from the container contract. 
Because federal jurisdiction in Robert Lawrence was based on diver-
sity, and therefore the parties had access to either state or federal court, 
the Second Circuit saw fit to reconcile the Erie question posed by the 
potential inconsistency of decisions in the two forums.?! Relying on the 
text and legislative history of the Act,72 the court reconciled the Erie 
question by holding the federal Act applicable in both forums provided 
the underlying contract was one of admiralty or interstate commerce. If 
the federal Act is applicable in both federal and state courts as a matter 
of federal substantive law, there is no potential for inconsistent decisions; 
hence, the Erie question is answered.73 
Eight years after Judge Medina's reconciliation, the Supreme Court 
decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 74 a 
case with facts75 virtually identical to those in Robert Lawrence. 
Although the Supreme Court agreed with Robert Lawrence in its conclu-
sions on the issues of separability76 and the Act's reliance on Congress's 
68.Id. 
69. !d. at 410. At common law, however, the primary impetus for viewing an arbitra-
tion agreement as separable from its container contract was to guarantee the legiti-
macy of the container contract while invalidating the arbitration agreement within. 
Id. 
70. Id. "Finally, any doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be resolved in 
line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original 
intention of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars." 
Id. 
71. Id. Robert Lawrence, Inc. was a Massachusetts corporation and Devonshire 
Fabrics, Inc. was a New York corporation. Id. at 404. If the suit had been brought 
in a New York state court, the arbitration agreement would not have been enforced. 
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Hence, the constitutional question 
raised in Bernhardt faced the court in Robert Lawrence. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d 
at 404. 
72. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 406-07. 
73. Id. at 407. Judge Medina wrote: "This is a declaration of national law equally 
applicable in state or federal courts." Id. Hence, there was no question of constitu-
tional law under Erie. Id. at 404-05. 
74. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
75. Prima Paint Corp., a Maryland corporation, entered into a contract for consulting 
services with Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., a New Jersey corporation. The 
contract contained an arbitration clause. After breach, Prima Paint Corp. alleged 
that Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. had fraudulently represented its solvency. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. served notice of intention to arbitrate. Prima 
Paint Corp. responded by filing a diversity action in federal court for rescission of 
the consulting agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement, and on the same 
grounds, petitioned the court for an order enjoining arbitration. Id. at 397-99. 
76. Id. at 402-04. 
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commerce powers,77 a comparison of the two decisions reveals several 
subtle differences in reasoning. 78 The most obvious difference was the 
absence of consideration by the Prima Paint Court of the Erie question 
posed by potential inconsistent decisions in state and federal forums. 79 
Whereas the Robert Lawrence court recognized and dealt with this ques-
tion by asserting that the federal Act was applicable in both forums,80 the 
Prima Paint majority ignored it.8! 
Although Justice Black argued in dissent that the Prima Paint ma-
jority had construed too broadly the language of the federal Act,82 a 
comparison of Robert Lawrence and Prima Paint reveals a greater reluc-
tance by the Supreme Court to stray from a strict interpretation of the 
statute. 83 Judge Medina of the Second Circuit relied on policy and his-
torical considerations when fashioning the rule on separability in Robert 
Lawrence;84 the Prima Paint Court found the same rule mandated solely 
by the language of section 4.85 The Court held that section 4, which 
orders a federal court to compel arbitration "once it is satisfied that the 
'making of the agreement for arbitration. . . is not in issue,' " requires 
the party alleging fraud to direct that allegation expressly to the agree-
ment to arbitrate in order to void that agreement.86 
The method employed by the Supreme Court in dealing with the 
77. Id. at 400-01. 
78. See Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. JOHNS 
L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1968). After reviewing Robert Lawrence, the Court stated: "We 
agree, albeit for somewhat different reasons .... " Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,400 (1967). 
79. Although the majority did not mention the increased potential for forum shopping, 
it did answer the constitutional question left open in Bernhardt - whether the Arbi-
tration Act could be enforced as a matter of federal substantive law in diversity 
cases. The Court stated: 
The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion 
federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity 
cases [but rather] whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are 
to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress 
plainly has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the 
affirmative. 
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405. 
80. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
81. Based on the Court's avoidance of this critical issue, and the opinion's abundance of 
directives aimed specifically at the federal courts, at least one commentator theo-
rized that Prima Paint was calculated to convey that the federal Act was not appli-
cable in state courts. See Aksen, supra note 78, at 22-23. 
82. Cj. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 409 (Black, J., dissenting) (Court's holding is not sup-
ported by the language or legislative history of the federal Act); id. at 410 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (language of section 4, considered alone, does not, as the majority held, 
provide an explicit answer to the separability question); id. at 416 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (Court's departure from Act's clear statement); id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(Congress, not the Court, may revise the federal Act). 
83. See Aksen, supra note 78, at 19-21. 
84. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
85. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (section 4 provides the "explicit answer" to the separa-
bility question). 
86. Id. at 403-04. 
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constitutional question posed by the application of federal substantive 
law in diversity cases similarly displayed the Court's eagerness to base its 
decision on the Act itself.87 Whereas the rationale in Robert Lawrence 
had been supported by legislative history and policy considerations,88 the 
Prima Paint Court again based its decision on the language of the statute: 
"It is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based 
upon and confined to the incontestable Federal foundations of 'control 
over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' "89 Hence, it appears that 
the Supreme Court was striving to reach Judge Medina's result in Robert 
Lawrence in a manner less likely to be criticized as judicial revisionism.90 
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: ABSENCE 
OF STATUTORY GUIDELINES FUELS 
A POLICY APPROACH 
A. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp. 
The Court was unable to adhere to the narrow statutory approach 
undertaken in Prima Paint when it was faced with less conspicuous arbi-
tration issues sixteen years later in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp. ,91 a case involving a construction contract 
dispute. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Hospital) entered into a 
contract with Mercury Construction Corp. (Mercury) for the construc-
tion of additions to its hospital building. The contract provided that all 
disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the 
construction work were initially to be referred to the project architect. 
All matters decided by the architect, or those not decided within a speci-
fied time, could then be submitted to binding arbitration.92 
Construction of the project began in July, 1975, and was to be com-
pleted by October, 1979. At a meeting in October, 1977, attended by 
representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the architect, Mercury 
agreed to comply with the architect's request to withhold its claims for 
delay and impact costs until the work was substantially completed.93 
Substantial completion occurred in February, 1979, and Mercury sub-
mitted its claims to the architect in January, 1980.94 After ten months of 
87. Aksen, supra note 78, at 20. 
88. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
89. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405. 
90. See Aksen, supra note 78, at 21. 
91. 460 U.S. I (1983). 
92. [d. at 4-5. The arbitration clause was Article 7.10 of A.I.A. (American Institute of 
Architects) Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction 
(1967 ed.). Ness, Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction and the Enforce-
ment of Construction Contract Arbitration Clauses, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 1983, at 
3,7 n.2. 
93. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,6 (1983). 
94. /d. at 5-6. 
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deliberation, the Hospital informed Mercury that it would pay nothing 
on the claims and filed a declaratory judgment action in North Carolina 
state court naming both Mercury and the architect as defendants. The 
Hospital alleged that Mercury had lost its right to arbitrate due to 
waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for 
arbitration.95 
Mercury responded by filing a diversity suit in federal district court 
seeking an order to compel arbitration under section 4 of the federal Act. 
On the Hospital's motion, the district court stayed Mercury's federal suit 
pending resolution of the state action because both involved the identical 
issue of the arbitrability of Mercury's claims.96 Mercury's appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resulted in reversal of the dis-
trict court's stay order and remand to the district court with instructions 
for entry of an order to arbitrate.97 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's order to arbi-
trate. 98 The question presented on appeal was not one of arbitration, but 
rather whether the district court properly stayed the federal action pend-
ing resolution of the parallel state court litigation.99 In resolving this 
issue, the Court relied on Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 100 which held that once federal jurisdiction is properly in-
voked, deference to parallel state court litigation is proper only in "ex-
ceptional circumstances." 101 In determining whether "exceptional 
circumstances" are present, Colorado River set forth a number of factors 
to be considered, including the avoidance of "piecemeal litigation" and 
the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the two forums. 102 Ap-
95. Id. at 7. 
96.Id. 
97. Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 
1981), affd, 460 U.S. I (1983). 
98. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983). 
99. Id. at 4, 13. 
100. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Colorado River involved the exercise of federal court jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate federal water rights. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.c. 
§ 666, waives sovereign immunity to permit joinder of the United States in some 
state-court suits for the adjudication of water rights. In Colorado River, the govern-
ment brought suit in federal district court against some 1,000 non-federal water 
users, seeking a declaration of the water rights of several Indian tribes and govern-
mental entities. A defendant in the federal court suit sought to join the United 
States in a state court proceeding to adjudicate all of the Unites States's claims in 
state court pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
!OJ. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda 
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959». 
102. In Colorado River, the Court mentioned four factors: (I) the assumption by either 
court of jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) the inconvenience of the federal 
forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in 
which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. Colorado River, 424 
U.S. at 818-19. A decision to dismiss a federal action because of a parallel state-
court action is not made on the basis of mechanical application of the Colorado 
River factors, but rather on a careful balancing of the factors as applied to a given 
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plying these factors in Moses H. Cone, the Court found no showing of the 
requisite exceptional circumstances to justify the district court's stay. \03 
The Court first considered the potential for piecemeal litigation. I04 
In its attempt to avoid arbitration, the Hospital argued that, if it were 
forced to arbitrate, it would be subject to duplicative proceedings - one 
with Mercury concerning its claim for delay and impact costs, and the 
other with the architect concerning the Hospital's indemnity claim. 
Although the former was within the purview of the arbitration agree-
ment, the latter was not. \05 The Hospital's tactic of joining a defendant 
not subject to an arbitration agreement is commonly used to further com-
plicate a dispute in an attempt to avoid arbitration. \06 A party typically 
argues that the ensuing complexity has rendered the virtues of arbitration 
- efficiency and cost effectiveness - unavailing, and therefore the arbi-
tration agreement should be set aside. \07 The Court, however, found this 
argument unconvincing and held that the federal Act requires "piece-
meal litigation" when necessary to give effect to an arbitration 
agreement. \08 
Second, the Court found that the order in which the two forums, 
state and federal, obtained and exercised their jurisdiction supported the 
court of appeals's refusal to defer to state court jurisdiction. \09 After 
expressing its view that priority is not to be measured in terms of which 
complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has 
been made in the respective forums, the Court found that greater pro-
gress had been made in the federal forum and thus federal jurisdiction 
was warranted. I \0 The Court buttressed its argument with the Congres-
sional intent embodied in the federal Act to "move parties to an arbitra-
ble dispute out of court and into' arbitration as quickly and easily as 
case. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. The balance is initially heavily weighted in 
favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction. !d. 
103. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19. 
104. Id. at 19-21. 
105. Id. 
106. Ness, supra note 92, at 5-6. 
107. See, e.g., County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N. W.2d 155, 
159 (Iowa 1979) (arbitration stayed); Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Pe-
terson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20, 24, 240 N.W.2d 551, 553 (1976) (same); J.F. Inc. v. 
Vicik, 99 III. App. 3d 815, 820-21,426 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1981) (same). 
108. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19-21. The Court relied on several decisions of the 
federal courts of appeals: C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan InCI Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 
1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1975); 
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat') Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969). 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20 n.23. This represents the first occasion where the 
Court was unable to base its holding on a procedural arbitration issue by strictly 
interpreting the language of the federal Act. Cf Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (section 4 provides the "explicit" rule on the 
separability issue); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (sec-
tion 2 requires a transaction in commerce before the federal Act is applied). 
109. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. 
110. Id. at 21-23. 
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possible." III The Court saw the district court's stay of arbitration pend-
ing the outcome of the state court litigation as frustrating this intent and, 
in effect, chastised the lower court for its action. I 12 
Third, the Court found another factor - which forum's law, federal 
or state, provides the rule of decision in a given case - to be instructive 
in determining which tribunal is proper. 113 The applicability of federal 
law usually supports the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction, whereas 
state law applicability usually favors surrender of federal court jurisdic-
tion. 114 In Moses H Cone, however, when considering the impact of the 
choice of law on the choice of forum, the Court found that "[f]ederallaw 
in terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or fed-
eral court."IIS The Court's finding that the federal Act applied in both 
forums actually weighed against the federal court's exercise of its juris-
diction 116 and thus was dicta.ll7 This was, however, a telltale indication 
of the Court's recognition of the applicability of the federal Act as sub-
stantive federal law in state courts and confirmed the reconciliation made 
by Judge Medina twenty-four years earlier in Robert Lawrence. I IS 
Once the Court was satisfied that the federal Act provided the rule 
of decision in Moses H Cone, it considered the dispute that had initiated 
the litigation - whether the issue of timeliness of demand for arbitration 
is to be decided by the arbitrator or the court. Unlike the issue of separa-
bility in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 119 the 
Court in Moses H Cone found the federal Act silent on the timeliness 
question. 120 As a result of this silence, the Court was forced to resort to 
the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" 121 as support 
for its holding that the timeliness issue is arbitrable. 122 The Court found 
that the "Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter offederallaw, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved m 
111. /d. at 22. 
112. Id. It appears that as long as a section 4 petition is filed with a federal court as soon 
as state-court proceedings are initiated, no federal district court would be justified in 
refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter, provided the usual prerequisite 
jurisdictional elements are present. See Ness, supra note 92, at 6. 
113. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23-26. 
114. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (case involves issues of federal law); id. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(same); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 825-26 (same). 
115. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. 
116. Because the federal Act is applicable in both forums, its status as federal law has less 
impact on the choice of forum. The Court, however, pointed out that its "task in 
cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction ... ; rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist 'exceptional' 
circumstances ... to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction." Id. at 25-26 (em-
phasis in original). 
117. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
118. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
120. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
121. Id. 
122.Id. 
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favor of arbitration."123 
The probable inadequacy of state court proceedings to protect Mer-
cury's rights was cited as another factor supporting surrender of the state 
court's jurisdiction. 124 After indicating that state courts are obliged to 
grant stays of litigation pending arbitration under section 3 of the federal 
Act,125 the Court expressed its concern as to whether the same is true of 
an order to arbitrate under section 4. 126 The uncertainty of the applica-
bility of section 4 in state court was used to demonstrate the potential 
inadequacy of available remedies in that forum. 127 This uncertainty was 
based upon the language of section 4 which provides that a party ag-
grieved by another's refusal to arbitrate "may petition any United States 
District Court"128 in order to compel arbitration. 129 The Court ex-
pressed its concern that a party able to effect a stay of court proceedings 
pending arbitration in state court via section 3 may be unable to compel 
arbitration in the same state court via section 4, and therefore may be 
forced to resort to a separate federal court action. This, it was argued, 
would be "a pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary 
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration ACt."130 The 
Court's language in Moses H. Cone is clear in its intent to direct state 
courts to provide the section 4 remedy, regardless of its jurisdictional 
inapplicability there. In a state court case with diverse parties, one 
party's resistance to arbitration following a section 3 stay would result in 
the filing of a separate federal action to compel arbitration under section 
4. This would not only be costly and inefficient, but could also be seen as 
an expression of a lack of good faith on behalf of the resisting party. 
B. Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Speculation as to the propriety of commanding the state courts to 
invoke section 4 was further emphasized in a more recent decision of the 
Supreme Court, Southland Corp. v. Keating. 131 In Southland, doubt was 
cast not only upon the use of section 4 in state courts, but also upon the 
use of section 3, which the Court in Moses H. Cone had stated would be 
applicable in state courts. 132 Southland considered the constitutionality 
123. Id. The Court listed several issues that it viewed as arbitrable: "construction of the 
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbi-
trability." Id. 
124. !d. at 26-27. 
125. Id. at 26-27, 26 n.35. 
126. Id. at 26-27. 
127. !d. The court noted that in a factual situation such as the one presented in Moses H. 
Cone, where the party seeking to avoid arbitration is the one from whom perform-
ance or payment is due, a section 3 stay is inadequate: "It leaves the recalcitrant 
party free to sit and do nothing - neither to litigate nor to arbitrate." Id. 
128. 9 U.S.c. § 4. 
129. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 & n.35. 
130. !d. at 27. 
131. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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ofa section of the California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL)\33 which 
was interpreted to require judicial consideration of claims brought under 
the statute and, therefore, resulted in the state court's refusal to enforce 
the parties' agreement to arbitrate such claims.134 Keating filed a class 
action against Southland Corporation on behalf of approximately 800 
California 7-11 franchises alleging, in addition to contract violations, a 
violation of the disclosure requirements of the CFIL. \35 Southland Cor-
poration's motion to compel arbitration was granted on all claims except 
those based on the statute.136 On appeal, California's highest court held 
that the CFIL did not contravene the federal Act and that the claims 
asserted under the statute were not arbitrable. \37 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that Congress, in enacting the federal Act, created "a 
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts [and] in-
tended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration agreements."138 
The Court relied largely upon legislative history l39 to support its 
interpretation of the federal Act as a Congressional proclamation that 
contemplated not only a broad purpose,l40 but also a broad reach.141 In 
dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Act's legislative history 
demonstrated an intent "to require federal, not state, courts to respect 
arbitration agreements."142 The majority responded by stating that the 
Act's express limitation to contracts involving commerce could be ex-
plained only by Congress's intent to utilize its commerce clause powers 
to enforce arbitration agreements in state courts. 143 
Justice O'Connor argued further that the majority's application of 
section 2 in Southland as a means for enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement exceeded that section's scope. l44 Section 2 is limited to mak-
133. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977). The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring 
any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or 
order hereunder is void." [d. 
134. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), 
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
135. Keating alleged, in part, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the CFIL. Southland 
Corp., 465 U.S. at 4. 
136. [d. 
137. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), 
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
138. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16. 
139. The Court relied on the House Report on the United States Arbitration Act, H.R. 
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924), and held that the federal Act is based 
upon "the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce 
and over admiralty.''' Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967». 
140. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12-13. 
141. [d. at 13-14. 
142. [d. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
143. /d. at 14-15. 
144. See id. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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ing arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable and enforceable," 145 but 
does not, in and of itself, provide for specific enforcement. 146 The right 
of specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement is available under sec-
tion 4. Justice O'Connor reasoned that if section 2 standing alone creates 
this right, the enforcement provisions, sections 3 and 4, are rendered 
largely superfluous. 147 In an attempt to rebut this contention, the major-
ity stated that its holding in Southland, preempting a state statute that 
withdraws power to enforce arbitration agreements, does not mean that 
sections 3 and 4 of the federal Act apply in proceedings in state courts, 148 
hence calling into question the language in Moses H. Cone to the effect 
that section 3 is applicable in state courts.149 
Although it may be true that sections 3 and 4 are not per se applica-
ble in state courts, the Court has clearly mandated the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements, and in doing so has created a need for procedures 
necessary to implement this mandate. It is irrelevant whether the proce-
dures used in state courts are those provided by the federal Act, or those 
provided by a synonomous state statute. 150 The ultimate outcome - the 
undisputable enforcement of arbitration agreements - will be the same. 
C. Silence on Procedural Issues Warrants Legislative Revision 
The vigor with which the Court has approached the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements is founded within the language of section 2. 
Those provisions left to carry out the Act's goals - sections 3 and 4 -
are, however, jurisdictionally deficient in state courts. 151 Regardless, the 
court's intent to encourage state court submission to these provisions is 
clear. 
If the Court should seek in a later decision to mandate the applica-
tion of section 3 in state courts, it could seize upon that section's ambigu-
ous language providing for a stay of court proceedings "in any of the 
courts of the United States."152 It may be argued that state courts are 
courts "of" the United States. 153 The Supreme Court could support its 
holding with the statement in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America 
145. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added). 
146. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 31-32. 
147. Id. at 31 n.20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 16 n.lO. 
149. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
150. A majority of states have enacted their own arbitration acts. Almost all have 
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act or some variance thereof. See 7 U.L.A. I 
(Supp. 1985). Although the Uniform Arbitration Act is in many respects similar to 
the federal Act, judicial interpretation in the various states differ. Id. 
151. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.lO. 
152. 9 U.S.c. § 3 (1982). 
153. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.34. But see Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 29 
n.18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor states that" 'courts of the United 
States' is a term of art whose meaning is unmistakable. State courts are 'in' but not 
'of the United States." Id. 
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that "Sections 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a whole." 154 Thus, it may 
be argued that the jurisdictional provisions of section 2 apply equally to 
section 3. Further support may be garnered from state court precedent. 
Many state courts have recognized that applicability of section 3 is nec-
essary to carry out Congress's intent to mandate the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements and have liberally applied that section. 155 
Section 4, unlike section 3, is not ambiguous in its terms l56 and is 
not within the realm of the Court's statement in Bernhardt. Still, because 
section 4 provides the remedy of specific performance of an agreement to 
arbitrate, the section is necessary to insure the implementation of section 
2.157 Although the scenario described in Moses H Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Mercury Construction Corp., encouraging a party in a state court 
proceeding to resort to a separate action in federal court to obtain a sec-
tion 4 order to arbitrate, 158 is available in a diversity situation, a question 
remains as to that party's options if there is no diversity. Once a party 
has obtained a section 3 stay order on the basis of a contract evidencing a 
transaction in commerce, the party conceivably will be unable to force 
arbitration because of the unavailability of a section 4 type remedy in 
state court and may also be denied access to a federal forum because 
there is no diversity. Furthermore, prior federal court decisions indicate 
conclusively that the federal Act does not create independent federal 
question jurisdiction. 159 
The need to rewrite the Act is supported by its failure to provide 
adequate procedural guidelines for the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. This failure is best exemplified by the manner in which the Court 
has addressed the procedural issues that have confronted it. In the 1967 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. decision, the 
Court addressed the procedural issue of separability and appeared reluc-
tant to rely on policy and legislative history to support its holding that 
section 4 requires an allegation of fraud to be directed expressly to an 
agreement to arbitrate in order to void that agreement. 160 However, in 
the Court's most recent decisions, Moses H Cone and Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, such was not the case. In Moses H Cone, the Court relied on 
154. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., DiMambro-Northend Assoc. v. Blanck-Alvarez, 251 Ga. 704, 309 S.E.2d 
364 (1983) (relying on Moses H. Cone); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 
199, 597 P.2d 380 (1979) (entire Act applies in state court); United Nuclear Corp. v. 
General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105,597 P.2d 290, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 911 (1979) 
(same). 
156. Section 4 is specific in that it permits a party aggrieved by another's refusal to arbi-
trate to "petition any United States district court." 9 U.S.c. § 4 (1982). 
157. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
159. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. I, 25 n.32 (federal Act does not create federal 
question jurisdiction); Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, and Co., 577 
F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1959) (same). 
160. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
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the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in determining 
that the issue of timeliness of demand is one to be decided by the arbitra-
tor.161 In Southland, the Court relied largely upon legislative history to 
support its finding that section 2 applies in state courts. 162 Thus, it is 
apparent that the Court has stretched statutory interpretation to its limit 
in order to resolve procedural issues under the Act. 
Another procedural issue, that of the permissibility of superimpos-
ing class actions on arbitration proceedings, remains unclear under the 
Act. In Southland, the parties failed to dispute this issue at the state 
court level, and the Supreme Court therefore refused to pass judg-
ment. 163 The California Supreme Court, however, concluded that such 
actions were permissible, but was similarly unable to base its decision on 
the face of the federal Act. l64 This presents an example of a state court 
confronted by the Act's facial silence on a specific procedure issue. 165 
The Court's sweeping policy of enforcing arbitration agreements has 
developed as a result of the lack of statutory guidelines in the form of a 
modern and workable arbitration statute. Implementation of this policy 
in federal courts arguably is tolerable. Consideration of the problems 
inherent in the interpretation of the ambiguous federal statute in fifty 
separate state jurisdictions, however, further underscores the need for 
legislative revision. 
Legislative revision should address the procedural problems arising 
under the Act. Such revisions should prescribe methods for undertaking 
class actions in arbitration, rules governing consolidation of arbitrable 
disputes, and guidelines for establishing when a party has waived its right 
to enforce an arbitration agreement. Although judicial decisions already 
have determined that the arbitrator, not the court, decides the issue of 
timeliness of demand,166 and that the separability doctrine governs the 
issue of fraud in the inducement of a container contract, 167 Congressional 
review of these decisions is appropriate. Finally, provisions must be ad-
ded indicating Congress's intent to exercise its commerce power not only 
through section 2, but also through every section of the Act. Only in this 
161. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. 
163. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 8-9. 
164. See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 
(1982), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Without 
stating that the federal Act controlled, the court analogized cases permitting consol-
idation of arbitration proceedings under the Act to the permissibility of class actions 
in arbitration. [d. at 610-11, 645 P.2d at 1208, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 376. 
165. A death of cases address the issue of class actions in arbitration. For discussion, see 
Keating v. Superior Ct., 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), 
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Keating v. Superior 
Ct., 109 Cal. App. 3d 858, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980), rev'd, 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d 
1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural 
Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787 (1981). 
166. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
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manner will it be clear that the entire Act applies in state courts. Fur-
ther, the scenario described in Moses H. Cone, where a party obtains a 
stay via section 3 in state court but is unable to compel arbitration via 
section 4,168 will be avoided. 
IV. THE THRESHOLD QUESTION - WHAT IS A CONTRACT 
"EVIDENCING A TRANSACTION INVOLVING 
COMMERCE?" 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
It is undisputed that, except in admiralty transactions, for an arbi-
tration agreement to come within the ambit of the federal Act it must be 
contained in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce."169 Although "commerce" is defined in section 1 of the Act as 
"commerce among the several states,"170 the terms "evidencing" and 
"involving" remain undefined. 
These terms have been targeted by those seeking to narrow the 
scope of the Act. A strict interpretation of the term "contract evidencing 
a transaction involving commerce" would seem to require the contract, 
on its face, to reveal that an interstate transaction is to take place. 171 
Similarly, the use of the term "involving" commerce, in lieu of the more 
traditional term "affecting" commerce, has been the basis of an argument 
that Congress, when conceiving the federal Act, did not intend to exer-
cise the full extent of its commerce clause powers. l72 A restricted exer-
cise of this power is also supported by consideration of Congress's 
relatively deflated powers under the commerce clause in 1925 when the 
federal Act was enacted. 173 
B. The Lumbard Test 
Notwithstanding these contrary arguments, courts have broadly 
construed the commerce requirement when applying the federal Act. 
Although numerous decisions have addressed the issue,174 few have at-
tempted to develop a test to determine when a contract is one "evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce." In Metro Industrial Painting Co. 
v. Terminal Construction Co., 175 Chief Judge Lumbard made what is per-
haps the only bona fide attempt. 176 The Chief Judge stated that the sig-
168. See supra notes 124-30, 158 and accompanying text. 
169. 9 U.S.c. § 2 (1982). 
170. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
171. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d 
Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, c.J., concurring) (recognizing and rejecting argument that 
Act requires a contract, on its face, to reveal an interstate transaction). 
172. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,409-10 & n.3 
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
173. See Ness, supra note 92, at 8 n.32. 
174. See infra notes 179, 184. 
175. 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961). 
176. See Ness, supra note 92, at 7-8 n.30. 
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nificant question "is not whether, in carrying out the terms of the 
contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they 
entered into it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated 
substantial interstate activity."177 This interpretation, Chief Judge Lum-
bard reasoned, is supported by a Congressional intent not to bind to arbi-
tration parties who did not choose to be bound, but rather "to assure 
those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate 
commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal 
judges or ... by state courts or legislatures."178 
A significant number of decisions, though not a majority, have relied 
on this reasoning. 179 In R.J. Palmer Construction Co. v. Wichita Band 
Instrument Co., 180 the court admitted that the evidence presented came 
perilously close to failing to meet the interstate commerce require-
ment. 181 Relying on Chief Judge Lumbard's reasoning,182 however, the 
court held that the construction contract was one involving interstate 
commerce because it "contemplated" the interstate shipment of con-
struction materials and was entered into by parties aware that the com-
pleted structure was to be used to house goods moved in interstate 
commerce. 183 
Numerous arbitration agreements arising out of construction con-
tracts have been found to involve interstate commerce as required by the 
federal Act. Courts have considered a variety of factors, including the 
parties' principal places of business, the interstate transport of construc-
tion materials and equipment, the interstate travel of construction and 
design personnel, the location of contract sureties, and the purpose for 
which a structure was constructed. 184 In view of the broad scope of these 
177. Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 
1961) (Lumbard, c.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
178. Id. Although it did not recognize the test proferred by Chief Judge Lumbard, the 
Supreme Court has cited this language with approval. See Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984). 
179. See Gavlick Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 389 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Pa. 1975) 
(dicta); Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Monte v. 
Southern Del. County Auth., 212 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Burke County Pub-
lic Schools v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,279 S.E.2d 816 (1981); Riverfront 
Properties Ltd. v. Max Factor III, 460 So.2d 948 (Fla. App. 1984); Cahoon v. 
Ziman, 60 N.C. App. 226, 298 S.E.2d 729 (1983); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wich-
ita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982). 
180. 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982). 
181. Id. at 365, 642 P.2d at 129. 
182. Id. at 367, 642 P.2d at 130. 
183. Id. 
184. See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 659 F.2d 
961 (4th Cir. 1980) (materials, equipment, personnel, bonding company); Mastmead 
MAC Drilling Corp. v. Fleck, 549 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (parties); Fairchild 
& Co. v. Richmond F. & P.R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305 (D.C.D.C. 1981) (lease, finan-
cial obligations, labor, materials); John Ashe Assoc. & Envirogenics Co., 425 F. 
Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (parties, materials, personnel); c.P. Robinson Constr. 
Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnership, 375 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974) 
(personnel, suppliers, bonding company); Warren Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg. 
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factors, it is difficult to imagine any contract arising from a major con-
struction project that would not involve sufficient interstate commerce to 
fulfill the terms of the federal Act. Thus, because the Supreme Court has 
held that the Act applies in state courts,185 existing state arbitration stat-
utes are virtually preempted in construction contract disputes. 186 
V. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ACT IN STATE 
COURTS - THE EFFECT ON MARYLAND LAW 
A. Timeliness of Demand - Is Bel Pre Good Law? 
Several state courts, relying on Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conk-
lin Manufacturing Co. and Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 
Inc., recognized the broad reach of the federal Act long before the 
Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating. 187 For example, 
the Texas Court of Appeals faced this issue over twelve years ago in 
Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc. 188 There, a common law rule invalidated 
arbitration agreements. 189 This common law rule was disregarded, how-
ever, because the contract involved interstate commerce, and thus the 
federal Act applied. 190 
Although some courts have refused, 191 most have applied the Act in 
state court proceedings if appropriate and properly pleaded. 192 Although 
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (personnel, materials, bonding company); 
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984) (coal mining 
leases); R.I. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 
363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982) (materials, use of structure); Northwest Mechanical, Inc. 
v. Public Uti I. Comm., 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979) (materials). 
185. See supra notes 9, 114-18, 138 and accompanying text. 
186. Maryland has its own arbitration act: Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, MD. 
CrS. & IUD. PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1982). The Maryland Uniform 
Arbitration Act was enacted in recognition of arbitration's primary purpose to "dis-
courage litigation and to foster voluntary resolution of disputes in a forum created, 
controlled and administered according to the parties' agreement to arbitrate." Bel 
Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320 
A.2d 558, 565 (1974) (citing Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287,291,297 A.2d 244, 
246 (1972», rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
187. See, e.g., Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973) (relying on 
both Prima Paint and Robert Lawrence); Path man Constr. Co. v. Knox County 
Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121,326 N.E.2d 844 (1975) (same); Pinkis v. Network 
Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973) (same). 
188. 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973). 
189. Id. at 636 n.2. The Texas common law rule required parties entering contracts 
subject to arbitration to do so only "upon the advice of counsel to both parties as 
evidenced by counsel's signature thereto." Id. 
190. Id. at 636-37. 
191. See Kress Corp. v. Edward C. Levy Co., 102 III. App. 3d 264, 430 N.E.2d 593 
(1981); Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del. 1973). 
192. See Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984); Northwest 
Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm., 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979); Mamlin v. 
Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S. W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973); Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita 
Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982); Pathman Constr. 
Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121,326 N.E.2d 844 (1975); Pinkis 
v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973). 
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Maryland courts have yet to apply the Act,193 it is arguable that had the 
federal Act as construed in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp. been applied in the 1975 case of Frederick Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. 194 the court of appeals would 
have reached an opposite conclusion. 
In Bel Pre, a dispute arose between the parties with regard to pay-
ment on a contract for the construction of a nursing home. Bel Pre Med-
ical Center, Inc. moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
clause in the contract. 195 Frederick Contractors Inc. did not deny that 
the substantive dispute was arbitrable under the contract terms, but con-
tended that Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. had waived its right to arbitrate 
by failing to file a timely demand for arbitration, and that the issue of 
compliance with such a procedural prerequisite was to be decided by the 
court, not the arbitrator. 196 Although the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the issue of timeliness was to be decided by the arbi-
trator,197 the court of appeals reversed, and without considering the fed-
eral Act, held that the procedural issue should be decided by a court. 198 
The court of appeals's position on this issue is contrary to the 
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Moses H. Cone. 199 Where the subject 
contract evidences a transaction in commerce, Bel Pre is superseded by 
the holding in Moses H. Cone that the timeliness issue is for the arbitra-
tor to decide. 2°O Although Bel Pre is no longer binding precedent in 
cases with contracts involving interstate commerce, the Bel Pre rule still 
may apply in those few situations where there is no interstate commerce. 
Following Bel Pre in those cases, however, would only promote confu-
sion and uncertainty. For example, if a party is faced with a dispute 
under circumstances similar to those in Bel Pre, the arbitrability of the 
procedural issue will turn on the presence of interstate commerce. Sec-
193. The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered application of the federal Act in 
Litton Bionetics v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981). See infra 
notes 223-32 and accompanying text. 
194. 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
195. [d. at 308-09, 334 A.2d at 527-28. The arbitration clause was Article 7.10 of A.I.A. 
(American Institute of Architects) form A201, General Conditions of the Contract 
for Construction (1967 ed.). [d. at 308, 310-11, 334 A.2d at 528-29. 
196. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 314, 
320 A.2d 558, 562 (1974), rev'd, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
197. /d. at 330, 320 A.2d at 572. The opinion was authored by the late Honorable Rita 
C. Davidson while she was an Associate Judge of the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. [d. at 309, 320 A.2d at 560. The late Judge Davidson, who later became 
an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, was considered especially 
well versed in arbitration law. Although reversed, this opinion was termed in sev-
eral succeeding court of appeals decisions as a "scholarly opinion." See Memorial 
Services for the Honorable Rita C. Davidson, Associate Judge Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, April 19, 1985, reprinted in 302 Md. LVIII, LX (1985) (Memorial Min-
ute presented by Honorable Richard P. Gilbert). 
198. Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 314, 334 
A.2d 526, 530 (1975). 
199. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
200. /d. 
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tion 2 of the federal Act would apply in state court if the contract 
"evidenc[ed] a transaction involving commerce,"201 and consequently the 
timeliness issue would be decided by the arbitrator regardless of a lack of 
diversity. If interstate commerce was not present, however, Bel Pre 
would require the court to decide the timeliness issue. The potential for 
inconsistent results is rampant. 
Such inconsistent results are suspect, especially when one considers 
that the Maryland policy with regard to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements parallels that prescribed by the federal Act. The Maryland 
Uniform Arbitration Act,202 enacted in 1965,203 embodies a legislative 
policy favoring executory agreements to arbitrate.204 Furthermore, arbi-
tration is viewed as a "favored action" in Maryland.205 In Moses H. 
Cone, the Supreme Court found this same policy embodied in the federal 
Act to support a holding that the arbitrator, not the court, decides the 
timeliness issue.206 Hence, it appears that consistent policies will never-
theless give rise to inconsistent results on this issue. To avoid this incon-
sistency, and to further a policy of promoting arbitration, the Maryland 
court should reconsider the rule set forth in Bel Pre. 
Maryland's highest court had just that opportunity in the 1983 case 
of Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp. ,207 decided less than ten months 
after the Supreme Court's Moses H. Cone decision. In Gold Coast, the 
court of appeals was again faced with an issue of whether a party had 
waived its right to arbitrate by its failure to comply with procedural pre-
requisites set forth by contract.2°8 As in Bel Pre, the procedural issue in 
Gold Coast was decided by the court and not the arbitrator.209 The court 
applied Maryland's Uniform Arbitration Act;210 the potential conflict 
with the federal Act, however, never arose because neither party at-
tempted to demonstrate that the contract was one involving com-
201. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1982). 
202. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984). 
203. Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 1965 Md. Laws, ch. 231, § 2. 
204. Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103,468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983); 
Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 448, 450 
A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982); C. W. Jackson & Assoc. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658, 666, 426 
A.2d 378, 382 (1981). 
205. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 
320 A.2d 558, 565 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 
(1975). 
206. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
207. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983). 
208. /d. at 99, 468 A.2d at 93. The arbitration agreement required that, in the event of a 
disagreement, an arbitrator be appointed by each party within fifteen days after a 
sixty-day negotiation period. Gold Coast Mall failed to abide by this provision. Id. 
at 101-02, 468 A.2d at 94. 
209. Id. at 108, 468 A.2d at 97-98. In determining whether to decide the procedural 
issue, the court relied on Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, 
Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 298 
Md. 96, 108 n.3, 468 A.2d 91, 98 n.3 (1983). 
210. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984). 
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merce. 211 Notwithstanding the absence of interstate commerce, the Gold 
Coast court could have seized the opportunity to criticize the Bel Pre rule 
and to dispel the inconsistency between that rule and the rule announced 
in Moses H. Cone. 
The court in Gold Coast refused to decide a second issue-whether 
the substantive dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment.212 The court held that questions of substantive arbitrability should 
in most cases be left for the arbitrator.213 Hence, under Maryland's Uni-
form Arbitration Act,214 an initial determination is made as to whether a 
disputed issue is substantive or procedural. An issue regarding the for-
mer is left to the arbitrator, and an issue regarding the latter is submitted 
to the court. Gold Coast demonstrates the Maryland court's alignment 
on the issue of substantive arbitrability with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the federal Act. 215 
Although the court thwarted the arbitrator's jurisdiction on the pro-
cedural issue in Gold Coast, the ultimate outcome was consistent with a 
policy of promoting arbitration. The court held that Gold Coast Mall's 
failure to comply with the procedural prerequisites did not amount to a 
waiver, and therefore arbitration should be compelled.216 The court's de-
nial of Lamar's attempt to avoid arbitration is indicative of how similar 
procedural disputes will be viewed in the future. It is unlikely that mere 
211. There was no discussion of the interstate commerce issue. The agreement in dispute 
was a lease. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 101-02,468 A.2d at 94-95. Whether the 
lease agreement was a transaction involving commerce is questionable. Compare 
Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond F. & P. R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305 (D.C.D.C. 1981) 
(lease agreement contemplating extensive commercial venture serving Washington, 
D.C., Maryland, and Virginia is a contract involving commerce) with Paramore v. 
Inter-Regional Financial Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90 
(1984) (where activity under lease occurred in one state, and only event occurring 
elsewhere was lessor's receipt of rental payments, contract did not involve 
commerce). 
212. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 108,468 A.2d at 97. 
213. Id. at 107-08,468 A.2d at 97. The issue of substantive arbitrability arises when the 
parties are in conflict as to the scope of an arbitration agreement. Once such an 
issue arises, the natural question is who decides - the court or the arbitrator. Ac-
cording to Gold Coast, the legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreement dictates that this issue should be left to the arbitrator. /d. at 107, 
468 A.2d at 97. 
214. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984). 
215. In Moses H. Cone, the court appeared to disregard the distinction between substan-
tive and procedural issues when considering arbitrability. See supra notes 120-23 
and accompanying text. 
216. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 114,468 A.2d at 100. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land previously addressed the waiver issue in Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated 
Jewish Charities, 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), where it was held that litiga-
tion of one issue subject to arbitration does not constitute a waiver of other unre-
lated arbitrable issues arising from the same contract. Id. at 455, 450 A,2d at 1310. 
See Note, Contract Law - Waiver of Arbitration Rights by Litigating One Issue is 
Not a Waiver of the Same Rights as to Unrelated Issues, Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. 
Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), 12 U. BAL T. 
L. REV. 585 (1983). 
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disregard of procedural prerequisites will be sufficient to demonstrate a 
party's intent to waive the right to enforce arbitration. 
B. The Prospect of Duplicative Proceedings as a Basis for Avoiding 
Arbitration 
In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court stated that "an arbitration 
agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other per-
sons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration 
agreement."217 Thus, under the federal Act, an attempt by one party to 
an arbitration agreement to join a party not similarly bound will not war-
rant undermining the agreement, regardless of the potential inconsis-
tency of results. 2lS 
The Maryland position on this issue was expressed in Charles J. 
Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc.,219 and is in accord with 
Moses H. Cone. In Frank, a construction project owner entered into two 
separate contracts: the first was with the general contractor and con-
tained provisions for arbitration; the second was with the project archi-
tect and lacked such provisions.22o When a dispute arose involving all 
three parties, the owner sought a stay of arbitration and argued that he 
otherwise would be subject to duplicative arbitration and judicial pro-
ceedings.221 The court of appeals rejected the owner's argument, again 
relying on the legislative policy favoring enforcement of executory agree-
ments to arbitrate, and held that this policy warranted enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement, regardless of the prospect of duplicative pro-
ceedings and the potential for inconsistent results. 222 
C. Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings 
The issue of the consolidation of arbitration proceedings was ad-
dressed by the court of appeals in another construction industry case, 
Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Construction CO.223 In Litton, the owner 
entered into arbitration agreements with both the general contractor and 
the project architect.224 After arbitrable disputes based on common sub-
ject matter arose between the owner and the architect and between the 
owner and the contractor, the owner filed a demand for arbitration and 
sought consolidation of both arbitration proceedings.225 Neither agree-
217. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,20 (1983). 
See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
219. 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982). 
220. Id. at 455, 450 A.2d at 1310. 
221. !d. This is a tactic commonly used to avoid agreements to arbitrate. See supra 
notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
222. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 459-60, 
460 A.2d 1304, 1311-12. 
223. 292 Md. 34,437 A.2d 208 (1981). 
224. Id. at 36-37, 437 A.2d at 209. 
225. Id. at 38, 437 A.2d at 210. 
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ment expressly required or prohibited consolidation.226 The court found, 
however, that provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act,227 
providing that an arbitration agreement "confers jurisdiction on a court 
to enforce the agreement,"228 permitted the exercise of judicial power to 
order consolidation.229 
In Litton, the owner not only sought to support its consolidation 
argument with the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 
but also contended in the alternative that the federal Act applied and 
similarly mandated consolidation.230 The court of appeals surveyed 
cases decided under the federal Act and noted that these cases inter-
preted the federal Act to allow consolidation.231 Thereafter, the court 
implied a willingness to apply the federal Act in proper circumstances, 
but found that no difference would result in the instant case and, there-
fore, refused to rule on the issue of the federal Act's applicability.232 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. and Southland Corp. v. Keating 
have displayed an unequivocal judicial policy mandating the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements in both federal and state courts. Southland de-
clares that state statutes impeding arbitratrion will not be tolerated under 
the auspices of the federal Act. Moses H. Cone, on the other hand, raises 
a presumption that questions of procedural arbitrability will never war-
rant access to the courts. 
Under Maryland law, however, questions of procedural arbitrability 
226. Id. at 43, 437 A.2d at 213. 
227. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984). 
228. Id. § 3-202 (1984). 
229. Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34,52-53,437 A.2d 208, 217-18 
(1981). The court found itself vested with the power to order the consolidation of 
arbitration agreements because of the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it by the 
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. The Uniform Act provides, in pertinent 
part, that "[a]n agreement providing for arbitration under the law of the State con-
fers jurisdiction on a court to enforce the agreement and enter judgment on an arbi-
tration award." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-202 (1984). The court, 
however, distinguished the existence of such power from the exercise of such power. 
In instances where conflicting arbitration provisions require alteration of contract 
rights in order to effect consolidation, consolidation should not be ordered. The 
power, however, still exists; the ultimate question is whether it should be exercised. 
See Litton, 292 Md. at 52-53,437 A.2d at 217-18. The court noted that, in deter-
mining whether to exercise the power to consolidate, a court should consider the 
same types of factors as those considered in determining whether to consolidate 
equity actions. Id. at 55, 437 A.2d at 219. 
230. Litton, 292 Md. at 39, 437 A.2d at 211. 
231. Id. at 56, 437 A.2d at 219-20. 
232. Id. The federal Act has been applied in at least two Maryland trial court decisions. 
See Commissioners of Aberdeen v. Conoc Constr. Corp., No. 30088/37/148 (Cir. 
Ct. for Harford County, Jan. 4, 1984); Saint Agnes Hosp. v. Charles J. Frank, Inc., 
No. 84039098/E16458 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City, Dec. 19, 1984) (Master's 
Report). 
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are proper subjects for judicial resolution. This posture, prescribed in 
Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. and confirmed 
in Gold Coast Mal/, Inc. v. Lamar Corp. stands contrary to the federal 
rule announced in Moses H. Cone. Until Maryland chooses to recant the 
Bel Pre rule in light of Moses H. Cone and Southland, the determination 
of who decides procedural issues will be reduced to a determination of 
whether the arbitration agreement is found in a "contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce." 
Remaining unclear, however, is just what degree of commerce is re-
quired before the federal Act must be applied. Federal and state courts 
have construed this requirement liberally, but whether these decisions 
reflect Congress's true intent in enacting the Act in 1925 is unclear. Also 
unclear is whether all sections, or only section 2 of the Act, apply in state 
courts in transactions involving commerce. 
These ambiquities burden the summary and speedy resolution of ar-
bitrable disputes and, therefore, point to the need for legislative revision 
of the Act. Failure by the legislature to address these issues will lead 
parties who contracted for the settlement of disputes by arbitration into 
the throes of the courtroom - the precise end arbitration is designed to 
avoid. 
Douglas M Fox 
